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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
We are asked to decide whether a habeas corpus 
petitioner who was subject only to registration requirements 
under Pennsylvania’s Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act (“SORNA”) when he filed his petition was “in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State Court,” as required 
for jurisdiction. We hold that the registration requirements 
were sufficiently restrictive to constitute custody and that they 
were imposed pursuant to the state court judgment of sentence. 
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Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court and remand for 
further proceedings.     
 
I. 
 
 Following a bench trial in the Court of Common Pleas 
of Bucks County, Jason Piasecki was convicted of fifteen 
counts of possession of child pornography. On April 26, 2010, 
the court sentenced him to a term of three years’ probation. At 
sentencing, the court informed Piasecki: 
So as to counts 16 through 30, as 
to each count the defendant is 
sentenced to 36 months’ county 
probation. The conditions of his 
sentence are that he undergo sex 
offender supervision, that he be 
subject to ten-year registration, 
that he have no unsupervised 
contact with minor children under 
the age of 18, excluding your son 
and your girlfriend’s son, without 
written permission of Bucks 
County Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
 
You’re to have no computer 
Internet use. You’re to continue in 
treatment with Dean Dixon and 
Dr. Nover. You’re not to drink, 
and you’re to take medications as 
directed. You’re ordered to pay 
court costs. 
 
I’m going to have you sign the 
mandatory sex offender 
conditions.1 
 
 At the time of sentencing, Pennsylvania sex offenders 
were subject to registration requirements under a statutory 
scheme referred to as Megan’s Law III.2 But in December of 
                                              
1 App. 150–52. 
2 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915(a)(1) et seq. (expired Dec. 20, 2012). 
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2012, as Piasecki pursued appellate and collateral relief in state 
court, the Pennsylvania legislature permitted its Megan’s Law 
statute to expire and replaced it with SORNA. It was enacted 
to “bring the Commonwealth into substantial compliance with 
the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006.”3 
Any state that did not implement restrictions similar to those 
set forth in the Adam Walsh Act stood to lose ten percent “of 
the funds that would otherwise be allocated for that fiscal year 
[under] . . . the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
of 1968.”4  When Piasecki filed his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 
2254, SORNA applied retroactively to any Megan’s Law 
registrant who lived in the Commonwealth.5  An offender who 
had been required to comply with Megan’s Law III was 
therefore automatically subject to SORNA’s increased 
registration and reporting requirements. 
 
 Piasecki was a Tier III offender under the provisions of 
SORNA. Accordingly, he was required to register in-person 
with the State Police every three months for the rest of his life.6  
The statute also required him to appear, in-person, at a 
registration site if he were to: 
• Change his name;  
• Change his residence or become transient;  
• Begin a new job or lose previous 
employment;  
• Matriculate or end enrollment as a student;  
• Add or change a phone number;  
• Add, change, or terminate ownership or 
operatorship of a car or other motor vehicle, 
and, as part of that visit, provide his license 
                                              
3 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.10 (citing P.L. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587). 
4 P.L. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 34, § 125 (implemented as 34 
U.S.C. § 20927).  
5 42 Pa.C.S §§ 9799.12–9799.14. 
6 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.15(a)(3), 9799.15(e)(3). A Tier III 
SORNA registrant could petition a court to exempt him or her 
from the registration requirements after twenty-five years 
provided that the registrant satisfied certain criteria and 
satisfy a threat assessment board. Id. § 9799.15(a.2)(1)-(9).  
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plate number, VIN number, and location 
where the vehicle will be stored; 
  
• Commence or change “temporary lodging;”7  
 
• Add, change, or terminate any email address 
or other online designation; or 
 
• Add, change, or terminate any information 
related to an occupational or professional 
license.8  
 
If Piasecki were to become homeless, he was required to 
“appear in person monthly and to be photographed.”9 Prior to 
any international travel, Piasecki had to “appear in person at an 
approved registration site no less than 21 days” before his 
anticipated departure.10 Failure to abide by any of these 
reporting requirements exposed Piasecki to criminal 
prosecution.11 
 
The parties do not dispute that Piasecki was subject to 
these restrictions—and only these restrictions—when he filed 
his § 2254 petition on December 4, 2014.12 His probation and 
its attendant conditions of supervision had expired on April 26, 
2013. Piasecki’s habeas petition attacked his underlying 
conviction on four grounds, none of which are relevant to the 
issues before us.13 
                                              
7 Temporary lodging is defined as “[t]he specific location, 
including street address, where a sexual offender is staying 
when away from the sexual offender’s residence for seven or 
more days.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.12. 
8 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(g)(1)-(9).  
9 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(h)(1). 
10 Id. § 9799.15(i).  
11 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.21(a); see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1 
(relating to failure to comply with registration requirements).  
12 Br. for Appellant 12; Br. for Appellee 13–15.  
13 Specifically, Piasecki alleged that the incriminating 
statements that were admitted at trial were given in violation 
of Miranda; the evidence was insufficient to support the 
verdict; the Commonwealth failed to preserve electronic 
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The District Court referred the matter to a Magistrate 
Judge, who recommended that the petition be dismissed for 
lack of jurisdiction. The Magistrate Judge acknowledged that 
Pennsylvania’s SORNA statute made “sex offenders’ 
registration obligations considerably more burdensome,” but 
ultimately concluded that Piasecki was “free to live, work, 
travel, or engage in any legal activity without the approval of a 
government official.”14 The Magistrate Judge also concluded 
that Pennsylvania’s sex offender registration requirements 
were “collateral consequences and not direct consequences of 
the petitioner’s conviction.”15 Accordingly, the court reasoned 
that they were not part of the judgment of the state court and 
could not support habeas corpus jurisdiction.  
 
In overruling objections that Piasecki filed to the Report 
and Recommendation, the District Court emphasized that 
Piasecki’s sentence had expired, and that the registration 
requirements were “merely collateral consequences of a 
conviction.”16 It also noted that Piasecki’s reporting 
requirements were not explicitly included in the state court’s 
judgment and that the requirements were “remedial rather than 
punitive.”17 Consequently, the court held that they could not 
support habeas jurisdiction because they did not constitute 
custody.  
 
We granted a certificate of appealability, and this timely 
appeal followed. 
 
 
II.18 
                                              
evidence that was favorable to his defense; and that his 
attorney was ineffective for failing to raise these issues.  
14 App. 13a–14a. 
15 App. 15a. 
16 App. 3a. 
17 App. 4a. 
18 This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 (granting jurisdiction over appeals from all final 
decisions of the District Court) and § 2253 (subjecting the 
final order in a habeas corpus proceeding to review).  We 
granted a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
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A federal court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus under § 2254 only if the petitioner was 
“in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court” when 
the petition was filed.19 “Thus, custody is the passport to 
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.”20   The jurisdictional 
requirement has two components—“custody” that arises 
“pursuant to the judgment of a state court” that is under 
attack.21 Put differently, the habeas jurisdictional provision 
requires that the petitioner be subject to a “non-negligible 
restraint on physical liberty” that is a “direct consequence of 
[the] conviction” being challenged.22 Therefore, we must 
examine these elements separately to determine if 
Pennsylvania’s SORNA requirements were sufficiently 
restrictive to constitute custody.  If they were, we must 
determine if they were directly imposed pursuant to the 
judgment of a state court. 
 
A. “In Custody” 
 
Over the past half-century, courts have addressed the 
issue of habeas custody in an effort to determine when various 
state-imposed restrictions were sufficiently onerous to 
constitute “custody” for purposes of habeas jurisdiction.  It is 
now beyond dispute that custody is not limited to “actual 
physical custody.”23 Rather, for the purposes of habeas 
jurisdiction, a petitioner is “in custody” if he or she files while 
subject to significant restraints on liberty that are not otherwise 
experienced by the general public.24 
                                              
2253(c)(2) & (3). We review the District Court’s dismissal of 
a habeas petition on jurisdictional grounds de novo. We 
review the denial of an evidentiary hearing for abuse of 
discretion. 
19 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 
20 United States ex rel. Dessus v. Pennsylvania, 452 F.2d 557, 
560 (3d Cir. 1971). 
21 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 
22 Stanbridge v. Scott, 791 F.3d 715, 719 (7th Cir. 2015).  
23 Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 239 (1963). 
24 Id.; see also Lehman v. Lycoming Cty. Children Servs. 
Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 510 (1982) (“[P]ast decisions have 
limited the writ’s availability to challenges to state-court 
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In Jones v. Cunningham, the Supreme Court considered 
whether a parolee was “in custody” for the purposes of habeas 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.25 The conditions of 
Jones’s parole required him to live with his family in Georgia; 
obtain permission to leave the community, change residence, 
and own or operate a car; and make monthly visits to his parole 
officer.26 Additionally, he was required to permit parole 
officers to come into his home or place of employment, “follow 
the officer’s instructions and advice,” and be subject to 
“revocation and modification at any time.”27  
 
Jones held that these parole restrictions were 
sufficiently restrictive to render the petitioner “in custody.” It 
rooted its analysis in the historical development of the custody 
requirement. The Court acknowledged that “the chief use of 
habeas corpus statutes has been to seek release of persons held 
in actual, physical custody in prison or jail.”28 However, the 
Court also noted that courts had “long recognized the writ as a 
proper remedy even [when] the restraint [was] something less 
than close physical confinement.”29 For example, English 
courts permitted the use of habeas corpus where “a woman 
alleged to be the applicant’s wife was being constrained by her 
guardians to stay away from her husband against her will.”30 
The test employed in England was “simply whether she was ‘at 
                                              
judgments in situations where–as a result of a state-court 
criminal conviction–a petitioner has suffered substantial 
restraints not shared by the public generally.”); Hensley v. 
Mun. Court, San Jose v. Mipitas Judicial Dist., Santa Clara 
Cty., Cal., 411 U.S. 345 (1973) (“The custody requirement of 
the habeas corpus statute is designed to preserve the writ of 
habeas corpus as a remedy for severe restraints on individual 
liberty.”). 
25 Jones, 371 U.S. at 238. 
26 Id. at 237. 
27 Id. at 238. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 238–39 (citing Rex. v. Clarkson, 1 Str. 444, 93 Eng. 
Rep. 625 (K.B. 1722)). 
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her liberty to go where she pleased.’”31 Jones noted that United 
States courts have historically found that “the use of habeas 
corpus has not been restricted to situations in which the 
applicant is in actual, physical custody.”32 Rather, “[h]istory, 
usage, and precedent can leave no doubt that, besides physical 
imprisonment, there are other restraints on [a person’s] liberty, 
restraints not shared by the public generally, which have been 
thought sufficient in the English-speaking world to support the 
issuance of habeas corpus.”33 
 
Turning to the specific conditions of Jones’s parole, the 
Court found that they constituted custody because they 
“significantly restrain[ed] petitioner’s liberty to do those things 
which in this country free men [were] entitled to do.”34 Indeed, 
the parole restrictions were myriad and demanding. The parole 
order confined Jones to “a particular community, house, and 
job at the sufferance of his parole officer.”35 He could not drive 
a car without permission, and he was required to open his home 
and place of employment to his parole officer at any time. 
Additionally, his parole officer required him to “keep good 
company and good hours,” stay away from “undesirable 
                                              
31 Id. (quoting Clarkson, 93 Eng. Rep. at 625); accord Rex v. 
Delaval, 3 Burr. 1434, 97 Eng. Rep. 913 (K.B. 1763) 
(ordering an indentured girl “discharged from all restraint, 
and be at liberty to go where she will” after her “master” 
assigned her to another man for “bad purposes”). 
32 Jones, 371 U.S. at 239. 
33 Id. at 240. 
34 Id. at 243. The Court also observed that the Virginia statute 
that governed Jones’s supervision explicitly provided that a 
“paroled prisoner shall be released ‘into the custody of the 
Parole Board,’ and the parole order itself placed Jones under 
the ‘custody and control of the Virginia Parole Board.’” Id. at 
241–42 (quoting Va. Code Ann. § 53-264).  While not 
dispositive, the Court was informed by the plain language of 
the statute and the order to which Jones was subject. As we 
discuss below, Pennsylvania’s sex offender registration 
requirements were included in the state court’s judgment of 
sentence here. 
35 Id. at 242. 
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places,” and “to live a clean, honest, and temperate life.”36 Any 
failure to follow these provisions, however slight, could have 
resulted in Jones being returned to prison.  
 
Under these circumstances, the Court concluded that 
even though Jones has been “release[d] from immediate 
physical imprisonment,” his parole conditions “significantly 
confine[d] and restrain[ed] his freedom.”37 That was “enough 
to keep him in the ‘custody’ of the members of the Virginia 
Parole Board within the meaning of the habeas corpus 
statute[.]”38 
 
After Jones, the Supreme Court decided Hensley v. 
Municipal Court.39 There, it   considered whether a similar—
but slightly less—restrictive scheme than the one in Jones 
could support habeas jurisdiction to adjudicate a § 2254 
petition of a petitioner who was released on his own 
recognizance pending appeal.40 The relevant bail statute 
required Hensley to appear “at all times and places as ordered 
by the court or magistrate releasing him and as ordered by any 
court in which, or any magistrate before whom, the charge 
[was] pending.”41 Finally, any court could “revoke the order of 
release and either return him to custody or require that he give 
bail or other assurance of his appearance.”42 
 
The Court held that these conditions supported habeas 
jurisdiction even though Hensley was subject to less restrictive 
supervision requirements than Jones.43 Despite the less 
intrusive requirements, Hensley was still subject to “restraints 
                                              
36 Id.  
37 Id. at 243. 
38 Id. 
39 411 U.S. 345 (1973). 
40 Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351. 
41 Id. at 348. Additionally, if he failed to “appear and [was] 
apprehended outside of the State of California” he waived his 
right to an extradition hearing. Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 348 (“It is true, of course, that the parolee is generally 
subject to greater restrictions on his liberty of movement than 
a person released on bail or his own recognizance.”). 
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‘not shared by the public generally,’” as Jones had been.44 
Hensley was obligated to appear wherever and whenever a 
court ordered him.45 He could not “come and go as he 
please[d]” because his “freedom of movement rest[ed] in the 
hands of state judicial officers, who [could have] demand[ed] 
his presence at any time without a moment’s notice.”46 The 
Court also noted that any failure to abide by these conditions 
was, itself, a criminal offense.47 He was, therefore, “in 
custody.”48 
 
We have also held that the jurisdictional “custody” 
requirement can be satisfied by restrictions other than physical 
confinement.49 In Barry v. Bergen County Probation 
Department,50 we were asked to decide whether a sentence of 
community service was sufficiently onerous to qualify as 
custody under § 2254. Barry’s probationary sentence had 
                                              
44 Id. (quoting Jones, 371 U.S. at 240). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 351. 
47 Id. Hensley also found it compelling that the petitioner’s 
liberty only resulted from a judicial order staying his 
sentence—which the government had twice tried to lift. In 
other words, incarceration was not a “speculative possibility.” 
Rather, Hensley had been forced to “fend off the state 
authorities,” and this “need to keep the stay in force [was] 
itself an unusual and substantial impairment of his liberty.” 
Finally, the Court also noted that its holding “did not interfere 
with any significant interest of the State” because even if it 
had concluded that Hensley was not in custody, it would only 
delay the filing of the petition until he was incarcerated after 
the stay was lifted. 
48 Id. at 351. 
49 See, e.g. Barry v. Brower, 864 F.2d 294, 296 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(finding that habeas jurisdiction continued “at least until the 
expiration of Barry’s probationary term”); Pringle v. Court of 
Common Pleas, 744 F.2d 297, 300 (3d Cir. 1984) (“Custody, 
however, has been liberally defined to include persons on 
parole, those released on their own recognizance pending 
appeal, and those who have been released from confinement 
pursuant to [a ‘good behavior’ time credit statute].”). 
50 128 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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expired when he filed his petition, but the sentencing court had 
also ordered him to complete 500 hours of community service 
over a period of three years.51 The community service 
requirement was imposed in lieu of a fine, which the 
sentencing court concluded Barry was unable to pay.52  
 
We held that the community service obligation 
constituted custody even though the “State did not monitor or 
restrict Barry’s every act” because his sentence nevertheless 
required him “to be in a certain place—or in one of several 
places—to attend meetings or to perform services.”53 Thus, he 
was “clearly subject to restraints on his liberty not shared by 
the public generally.”54 As a result, Barry’s community service 
sentence constituted custody that was sufficiently restrictive to 
support habeas jurisdiction.55 
 
In reaching that decision, we relied on Dow v. Circuit 
Court of the First Circuit, a per curiam decision from the Court 
                                              
51 Id. at 159, 161. 
52 Id. at 158–59.  
53 Id. at 161. 
54 Id. at 161 (citing Dow v. Circuit Court of the First Circuit, 
995 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)).  
55 We rejected the state’s argument that Barry was not in 
custody because he was not “supervised on a continuous 
basis.” Barry, 128 F.3d at 161 (citing Poodry v. Tonawanda 
Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 894 (2d Cir. 1996)). A per 
curiam opinion issued by this Court in 2003, Obado v. New 
Jersey, 328 F.3d 716 (3d Cir. 2003) (per curiam), cited Barry 
for the proposition that “some type of continuing 
governmental supervision” was required to support habeas 
jurisdiction. However, Obado cited the portion of Barry that 
discussed the state’s argument concerning habeas jurisdiction. 
Obado, 328 F.3d at 717 (citing Barry, 128 F.3d at 160). The 
very paragraph in Barry that Obado cites ends with the 
conclusion “that the state has read § 2254’s custody 
requirement too narrowly,” Barry, 128 F.3d at 160.  In fact, 
Barry conclusively rejects that argument. Id. at 161 (“Equally 
unavailing is the State’s contention that Barry was not ‘in 
custody’ because he was not supervised on a continuous 
basis.”). 
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of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which we found to be “quite 
compelling and analogous” to the question before us in 
Barry.56 Dow’s sentence for DUI required him to attend 
fourteen hours of alcohol rehabilitation classes.57 He had the 
option of scheduling the classes over a three- or five-day 
period.58 Dow filed a § 2254 petition after his probationary 
sentence was completed but before he attended the classes. The 
court concluded that Dow’s in-class obligation supported 
habeas jurisdiction. The sentence required Dow’s “physical 
presence at a particular place” and “significantly restrain[ed] 
[his] liberty to do those things which free persons in the United 
States are entitled to do.”59 His mandated presence at the 
classes meant that he could not “come and go as he 
please[d].”60 Therefore, the Court held that the sentence “must 
be characterized, for jurisdictional purposes, as ‘custody.’”61  
 
More recently, in United States v. Ross,62 we considered 
whether a $100 “special assessment” that accompanied a 
conviction for possessing a machine gun constituted “custody” 
for the purposes of § 2255.63 Relying on the precedent we have 
described above, Ross set forth a three-part test for answering 
that question.64 We held that a restriction is custodial if it 
                                              
56 Barry, 128 F.3d at 160. 
57 Dow, 995 F.2d at 922. 
58 Id. at 922–23.  
59 Id. at 923. 
60 Id (quoting Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351).   
61 Id. 
62 801 F.3d 374 (3d Cir. 2015). 
63 Ross, 801 F.3d at 379. Ross arose in a slightly different 
context, but it is still helpful. In Ross, the government alleged 
that the petitioner was ineligible for relief under § 2255 
because that statute could only afford relief to a “prisoner in 
custody . . . claiming the right to be released upon the ground 
that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution 
or laws of the United States[.]” Id. at 378 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255a)). The issue in Ross was, therefore, about “custody,” 
but not jurisdiction. Nevertheless, we addressed the definition 
of “custody” for the purposes of habeas corpus. Accordingly, 
we think that its analysis is helpful to our inquiry here. 
64 Id. at 379. 
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provides for restraints that are “(1) severe, (2) immediate (i.e. 
not speculative), and (3) not shared by the public generally.”65   
 
Applying this test to Ross’s special assessment, we 
concluded that a fine is not the type of obligation that can 
support habeas jurisdiction. We noted that the Supreme Court 
has “emphasized the physical nature of the restraints” when 
defining custody.66 Ross’s fine imposed no analogous 
restriction on his freedom of movement and thus could not be 
viewed as “severe.”67 Thus, Ross could not challenge a special 
assessment under § 2255. The decision was consistent with our 
own precedent and decisions of our sister circuit courts of 
appeals.  Courts consistently conclude that the “monetary 
component of a sentence is not capable of satisfying the ‘in 
custody’ requirement of federal habeas statutes.”68 
 
Given this precedent, the question of whether Piasecki’s 
registration requirements were sufficiently restrictive to 
constitute custody is easily answered. They were. At a 
minimum, Piasecki was required “to be in a certain place” or 
“one of several places”—a State Police barracks—at least four 
times a year for the rest of his life.69 The state’s ability to 
compel a petitioner’s attendance weighs heavily in favor of 
concluding that the petitioner was in custody.70 Further, 
Piasecki was not free to “come and go as he please[d].”71 Any 
change of address, including any temporary stay at a different 
residence, required an accompanying trip to the State Police 
barracks within three business days.72 He was even required to 
regularly report to police if he had no address and became 
homeless. In addition, Piasecki could have no “computer 
                                              
65 Id. (parenthetical in original). 
66 Id. at 379–80 (citing Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351; Peyton v. 
Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 66–67 (1934); Jones, 371 U.S. at 242).  
67 Id. at 379. 
68 Id. at 380 (citations omitted).  
69 Barry, 128 F.3d at 161; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(a)(3).  
70 Dow, 995 F.2d at 923; Barry, 128 F.3d at 160–61. 
71 Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351. 
72 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(g)(2), (3), (4), (7). 
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internet use.”73 The SORNA statute also compelled Piasecki to 
personally report to the State Police if he operated a car, began 
                                              
73 Such prohibitions on computer and internet access are 
relatively common. Yet, it is not at all clear that the judges 
imposing such sweeping and unconditional bans appreciate 
the impact they would have if literally interpreted and 
enforced.  A literal enforcement of such provisions would 
subject one to violation for using an ATM, using a 
“smartphone,” seeking directions from any device that 
utilizes GPS navigation, or even driving a relatively late 
model car—most, if not all, of which are equipped with 
computers that are an integral part of the car’s functioning. 
See United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 148 n.8 (3d Cir. 
2007) (noting that modern cars “contain at least one 
computer” and “might have as many as 50 microprocessors”) 
(citations omitted). As a result, many courts have struck down 
statutes or vacated sentences that impose broad bans on 
computer and internet usage. See, e.g., Packingham v. North 
Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1738 (2017) (holding that a statute 
that prevented sex offenders from accessing social media 
websites violated the First Amendment); United States v. 
Holena, 906 F.3d 288, 295 (3d Cir. 2018) (vacating a 
sentence that banned a defendant from possessing or using a 
computer or other electronic communication device and 
prohibited him from using the internet without his probation 
officer’s approval); Voelker, 489 F.3d at 144 (vacating a 
sentence that imposed “an absolute lifetime ban on using 
computers and computer equipment as well as accessing the 
internet”); United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 188 (3d Cir. 
2010) (vacating a sentence that prohibited an offender from 
using a computer with internet access “unless he received 
approval from his probation officer to use the internet and 
other computer networks”); United States v. Albertson, 645 
F.3d 191, 194, 200 (3d Cir. 2011) (vacating a sentence that 
barred an offender from using a computer with online access 
without preapproval from a probation officer and holding 
that, “in a time where the daily necessities of life and work 
demand not only internet access but internet fluency, 
sentencing courts need to select the least restrictive 
alternative for achieving their sentencing purpose”); United 
States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 878 (7th Cir. 2003) (“We find 
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storing his car in a different location, changed his phone 
number, or created a new email address.74 These are 
compulsory, physical “restraints ‘not shared by the public 
generally.’”75 Unlike the special assessment considered in 
Ross, these restraints compelled Piasecki’s physical presence 
at a specific location and severely conditioned his freedom of 
movement. They were more severe than the community service 
requirement in Barry or the mandatory alcohol classes 
considered in Dow.  
 
Moreover, any failure to abide by the restrictions was 
“itself a crime,” just like the situation facing the petitioner in 
Hensley.76 If Piasecki failed to report to the State Police 
barracks within three days of any triggering event listed in the 
SORNA statute, he could be charged with a felony of the 
second degree.77 In Pennsylvania, such felonies are punishable 
by up to ten years’ imprisonment.78 If Piasecki provided 
inaccurate information, he faced prosecution for a felony of the 
first degree and incarceration of up to twenty years.79 Given 
the level of restriction imposed by the registration 
requirements and the harsh consequences that would result 
from failing to adhere to them, we easily conclude that the 
restrictions placed on Piasecki were “severe.”80 
 
The remaining two prongs of the test we announced in 
Ross are also easily satisfied. The restrictions were “immediate 
(i.e. not speculative)”81—neither side disputes that Piasecki 
was subject to all of SORNA’s requirements when he filed the 
petition at issue. Finally, and as explained above, these 
                                              
that to the extent that the condition is intended to be a total 
ban on Internet use, it sweeps more broadly and imposes a 
greater deprivation on Holm’s liberty than is necessary[.]”).   
74  42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(g). 
75 Hensley 411 U.S. at 351 (quoting Jones, 371 U.S. at 240). 
76 Id. 
77 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.21; 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(c)(1). 
78 18 Pa.C.S. § 106(b)(3). 
79 42 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(c)(3); 18 Pa.C.S. § 106(b)(2). 
80 Ross, 801 F.3d at 379. 
81 Id.  
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restrictions were obviously “not shared by the public 
generally.”82 
 
We recognize that several of our sister circuit courts of 
appeals have found that various sex offender registration 
schemes were not sufficiently restrictive to constitute 
“custody.”83 As we explain below, many courts have held that 
registration requirements cannot support habeas jurisdiction 
because they were collateral consequences of a conviction that 
were not imposed pursuant to the judgment of a state court.84 
Others have held that sex-offender registration conditions do 
not impose a severe restriction on an individual’s freedom.85 
We do not find those cases compelling for two reasons.   
 
First, many of our sister circuit courts of appeals that 
have found sex offender registration requirements could not 
support habeas jurisdiction reached that conclusion when 
considering restrictions imposed under pre-SORNA statutes.86  
                                              
82 Id. 
83 See, e.g., Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 
2012); Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 719 (7th Cir. 2008); 
Leslie v. Randle, 296 F.3d 518, 521–23 (6th Cir. 2002); 
Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001). 
84 See infra Part II.B. 
85 E.g., Calhoun v. Attorney Gen. of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 
1074 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that “the Colorado sex-
offender registration requirements at issue here are collateral 
consequences of conviction that do not impose a severe 
restriction on an individual’s freedom” because the registrant 
was “free to live, work, travel, and engage in all legal 
activities without limitation and without approval by a 
government official”); Virsnieks, 521 F.3d at 719 (“[T]he 
Wisconsin sexual offender registration statute does not 
impose any significant restriction on a registrant’s freedom of 
movement . . . . [It] does not limit where a registrant may 
move or travel within Wisconsin, within the United States or 
internationally”).  
86 See Zichko 247 F.3d at 1019; Leslie 296 F.3d at 521–23; 
Wilson 689 F.3d at 338. 
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Those registration requirements were not as onerous as those 
imposed under SORNA.87  
 
Second, we have explicitly departed from the courts that 
have held that registration requirements are not custodial 
because they do not require pre-approval from the government 
before a registrant travels, thus not limiting his or her ability to 
move freely.88 In Barry, we held that custodial “restraint does 
not require ‘on-going supervision’ or ‘prior approval.’”89 
Rather, we concluded that even though the government did not 
“monitor[] Barry’s every move, [it] nevertheless performed an 
oversight function” and that “level of supervision was clearly 
adequate” to qualify as custody.90 Accordingly, we cannot 
conclude that Piasecki’s supervision did not amount to custody 
based on a “pre-approval” theory. 
 
In sum, we hold that Piasecki was subject to severe 
restraints on his liberty not shared by the public generally. 
Tasks as banal as changing an e-mail address or taking a 
week’s vacation required him to physically appear at a State 
Police barracks. Even in the absence of those ostensibly 
elective choices, Piasecki was compelled by the state to report 
to a police station every three months for the rest of his life. 
We hold that those requirements were at least as restrictive as 
those encountered in Barry and Dow and clearly rise to the 
level of “custody” for purposes of our habeas jurisdiction.  
 
B. “Pursuant to the Judgment of a State Court” 
                                              
87 See, e.g., Wilson, 689 F.3d at 338 (allowing registration by 
mail); Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 
1998) (same).  We take no position on whether we would find 
such conditions sufficiently restrictive to constitute custody 
for habeas purposes if the issue were presented to us in an 
appropriate case. 
88 See, e.g., Virsnieks, 521 F.3d at 719; Williamson, 151 F.3d 
at 1184 (“Williamson cannot say that there is anywhere that 
the sex offender law prevents him from going.”). 
89 Barry, 128 F.3d at 161 (citing Poodry v. Tonawanda Band 
of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 894 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
90 Id. 
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Even an onerous restriction cannot support habeas 
jurisdiction if it is nothing more than a “collateral 
consequence” of a conviction.91 Rather, the custody that is a 
condition precedent to our habeas jurisdiction must be a direct 
result of “the conviction or sentence under attack” when the 
petition is filed.92 Thus, a court will not have jurisdiction to 
rule on a habeas petition if “the sentence imposed for [the 
challenged] conviction has fully expired at the time [the] 
petition is filed.”93 This requirement is evident from the plain 
text of § 2254, which states that the petitioner must be “in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”94    
 
We must therefore decide whether Piasecki’s custodial 
restrictions were imposed as part of his sentence or if they were 
merely collateral consequences of his underlying child 
pornography convictions.  
 
We begin at perhaps the most obvious starting point—
the actual judgment of sentence entered by the state court. Two 
documents from the state court record inform and guide our 
inquiry—the “Bucks County Criminal Court Sheet” and the 
“Bucks County Mandatory Sex Offender Conditions” Order. 
Both show that the registration requirements were part of the 
judgment of sentence.  
 
The Court Sheet has a handwritten notation under 
“Sentence,” stating that, in addition to “Sex Offender 
Supervision,” Piasecki was sentenced to “Registration” for “10 
yrs.”  More compellingly, the Sex Offender Conditions Order 
states that Piasecki’s “SENTENCE IS SUBJECT TO THE 
FOLLOWING CONDITIONS IN ADDITION TO THOSE 
WHICH APPEAR ON THE COURT SHEET.” Under that 
heading, the sentencing court checked a box next to “Sex 
Offender Registration Pursuant to Megan’s Law” and another 
box indicating “10 Year Registration.” 
 
                                              
91 Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492 (1989) (per curiam). 
92 Id. at 490. 
93 Id. at 491. 
94 28 U.S.C § 2254(a) (emphasis added). 
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These documents weigh strongly in favor of finding that 
the sex-offender registration requirements were part of 
Piasecki’s sentence and therefore imposed “pursuant to the 
judgment of a state court.”95 Both of the documents plainly 
reflect that the registration requirements were a part of the 
sentence.  
 
As compelling as this record is, we will not end our 
inquiry there. Federal courts confronted with the question of 
whether sex offender registration requirements are part of the 
state court judgment of sentence also look to state law to see if 
the state construes sex offender registration as a punitive aspect 
of a criminal sentence or a remedial measure imposed 
collaterally. Our sister circuit courts of appeals that have held 
registration requirements are not imposed pursuant to the 
judgment of sentence have done so, in part, because the 
respective state courts have determined that their state 
registration schemes are remedial, not punitive. 96 
 
Pennsylvania courts have concluded otherwise. Just two 
months before Piasecki filed his habeas petition, the 
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania decided Coppolino v. 
                                              
95 28 U.S.C § 2254(a) 
96 See Bonser, 659 Fed. App’x at 127 n.1 (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Whanger, 30 A.3d 1212, 1215 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2011) (noting that Pennsylvania deemed a sexually violent 
predator designation as a “collateral consequence of a 
conviction” and hence “not a sentence”)); Calhoun, 745 F.3d 
at 1074 (citing People v. Sheth, 318 P.3d 533, 534 (Colo. 
App. 2013) (“Moreover, the Colorado sex-offender 
registration requirements are remedial, not punitive.”)); 
Virsnieks 521 F.3d at 720 (citing State v. Bollig, 605 N.W. 2d 
199, 205 (Wis. 2000) (“[T]he Wisconsin sexual offender 
registration is considered remedial, rather than punitive, in 
nature.”)); Leslie, 296 F.3d at 522–23  (citing State v. Cook, 
700 N.E. 2d 570, 585 (Ohio 1998) (“The Ohio Supreme Court 
has also held that the sexual-predator statute is remedial as 
opposed to punitive in nature . . . . [This] provides additional 
support for our conclusion that the classification, registration, 
and community notification provisions are more analogous to 
collateral consequences . . . .”)). 
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Noonan, which held that SORNA’s “in-person updating 
requirements” were punitive.97 There, Coppolino filed a writ 
of mandamus asking the Commonwealth Court to remove him 
from the list of offenders required to comply with SORNA.  
Like Piasecki, he had initially been required to register under 
Megan’s Law, but became subject to SORNA’s registration 
requirements when they took effect in 2012. He alleged that 
several of the new registration requirements were punitive and 
that subjecting him to the increased punishment violated 
principles of double jeopardy.   
 
Coppolino held that the quarterly registration 
requirements were not punitive, but the in-person updates 
were. The court reasoned that the quarterly registration 
requirements were not punitive because they left Coppolino 
free to live as he chooses and did not prevent him from 
engaging in any given activity.  
 
The in-person updates, however, were punitive because 
they imposed “an affirmative disability or restraint on 
registrants by inhibiting their ability to travel freely.”98 The 
court specifically pointed to the “temporary lodging” and 
“motor vehicle” restrictions that SORNA required registrants 
to follow and held that they were particularly restrictive.99 If, 
the court surmised, a hotel where the registrant was planning 
to stay was full, “he would have three days to return to 
Pennsylvania and report the change in person or risk a five year 
prison sentence.”100 Similarly, it was “unclear how a registrant 
travelling to another city would be able to register, prior to 
renting a car there, a vehicle’s license plate number and 
registration number and other identifier.”101 If the registrant 
were unable to determine such information in advance, he 
would have to return within three business days to report the 
information in person.”102 The court noted that this “might be 
                                              
97 Coppolino v. Noonan, 102 A.3d 1254, 1278 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 2014). 
98 Id. at 1277. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
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impossible” depending on “where and how the registrant is 
traveling.”103  
 
Coppolino concluded that, by impairing a citizen’s 
“basic right” of “freedom of movement,” the periodic reporting 
requirements imposed an affirmative restraint that was 
disproportionate to any public purpose that it served.104 “On 
balance, this disproportionality, along with the similarity to the 
traditional punishment of parole and the substantial 
infringement of a fundamental right” led the court to conclude 
that the provisions were punitive.105 Therefore, the 
Commonwealth Court held that those restrictions could not be 
applied to Coppolino without violating prohibitions against ex 
post facto laws.  
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed Coppolino 
in a per curiam opinion.106 But that was not its final say on 
Pennsylvania’s SORNA statute. In Commonwealth v. 
Muniz,107 it held that all of the SORNA registration provisions 
were punitive and that applying them retroactively violated the 
Pennsylvania Constitution.108  The OAJC and two concurring 
                                              
103 Id (internal quotation marks omitted). 
104 Id. at 1278. 
105 Id. 
106 Coppolino v. Noonan, 125 A.3d 1196 (Pa. 2015) (per 
curiam). 
107 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017). 
108 Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1193. Muniz was a divided opinion. 
Three justices joined the Opinion Announcing the Judgment 
of the Court (“OAJC”) concluding that Pennsylvania’s 
SORNA statute violated both the U.S. Constitution and the 
Pennsylvania Constitution, which, in their estimation, 
provided “even greater [ex post facto] protections than its 
federal counterpart.” Id. at 1223.  Two justices concurred in 
the entirety of the opinion except for the portions that held the 
Pennsylvania Constitution provided greater protections than 
the U.S. Constitution. In their view, the “state and federal ex 
post facto clauses are coterminous.” Id. at 1232 (Wecht, J., 
concurring). The Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court dissented, finding that “SORNA does not impose 
punishment and, thus, does not violate either the federal or 
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justices agreed that the Pennsylvania legislature did not intend 
to create a punitive scheme—but nevertheless did so when it 
enacted SORNA.109 Retroactive application of the scheme 
therefore violated the Pennsylvania Constitution’s ex post facto 
clause. 
 
As a result of Coppolino and Muniz, Pennsylvania 
courts have concluded that SORNA’s registration 
requirements are punitive, not remedial—unlike the courts in 
nearly every other state. This supports Piasecki’s claim that the 
registration requirements imposed upon him are punitive 
sanctions imposed pursuant to the state court’s judgment of 
sentence rather than collateral consequences or remedial 
measures.  
 
Moreover, Pennsylvania state court decisions have 
historically treated sex offender registration requirements as 
part of the judgment of sentence.  The Commonwealth 
concedes that registrants seeking to challenge their registration 
status have traditionally done so by appealing the judgment of 
sentence, and Pennsylvania courts treat a registrant’s “status” 
under a sex offender registration statute as “a component of the 
judgment of sentence.”110 Challenges to a registration 
classification, therefore, must be made in the context of a 
challenge to the judgment of sentence itself.111 Thus, under 
                                              
state constitutions’ ex post facto clauses.” Id. at 1233 (Saylor, 
C.J., dissenting). The net precedential effect of these opinions 
was “confined to the determination that SORNA’s 
registration requirement is punishment that runs afoul of the 
ex post facto clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution when 
applied retroactively.” Commonwealth v. Hart, 174 A.3d 660, 
667 n.9 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017). 
109 Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1219, 1223; id. at 1224 (Wecht, J., 
concurring). 
110 Br. for Appellee, 20 (quoting Commonwealth v. Harris, 
972 A.2d 1196, 1201–02 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (“We agree 
that the term ‘judgment’ is not limited to the court’s sentence 
of incarceration, but also includes that status determination 
under Megan’s Law.”)). 
111 Commonwealth v. Leonard, 172 A.3d 628, 631 (Pa Super. 
Ct. 2017) (“Appellant challenges the requirements imposed 
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Pennsylvania law, SORNA registration requirements are 
imposed pursuant to the state court judgment of sentence. 
 
Nevertheless, we recognize that one factor does support 
the contrary view. As the Commonwealth notes, the 
registration requirements at issue here were created more than 
two years after Piasecki was sentenced. Arguably, then, 
Piasecki’s registration requirements were imposed pursuant to 
an act of the legislature, not a state court judgment. This 
argument has some force, but ultimately we disagree with the 
Commonwealth’s position because Piasecki became subject to 
SORNA’s registration requirements as a “direct consequence 
of [the] conviction” being challenged.112 
 
Piasecki became subject to SORNA’s registration 
requirements by virtue of his conviction and subsequent 
judgment of sentence. Under the initial version of SORNA 
passed by the Pennsylvania legislature, any person who was 
“required to register with the Pennsylvania State Police . . . 
prior to the [amendment]” and who had “not fulfilled the period 
of registration as of the effective date of this section” became 
subject to SORNA’s increased registration requirements.113 In 
other words, Piasecki was subject to SORNA’s registration 
requirements because of the sentence imposed pursuant to the 
state court judgment. 
 
We therefore conclude that SORNA’s registration 
requirements rendered Piasecki “in custody pursuant to the 
judgment of a State Court” when he filed his petition.   
 
                                              
by the trial court that he register as a sex offender for life 
based upon the court’s interpretation of SORNA’s 
requirements.”) (emphasis in original); Commonwealth v. 
Sauers, 159 A.3d 1, 16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) (noting that a 
challenge to a Tier III SORNA classification is a “non-
waivable legality-of-sentence issue,” vacating “the lifetime 
registration portion of Appellant’s sentence” and 
“remand[ing] for re-sentencing under SORNA”). 
112 Stanbridge, 791 F.3d 715, 719 (7th Cir. 2015).  
113 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13(3) (2012); 2011 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 
2011-111 (S.B. 1183) (PURDON'S) 
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C. The Limits of Our Ruling 
 
Many of our sister circuits have predicted that a ruling 
such as the one we announce today would render the “in 
custody” requirement of the habeas statute superfluous.114 Our 
decision today raises no such concerns.  We do not hold that 
any collateral consequence of conviction can support habeas 
jurisdiction. Rather, we hold that the custodial jurisdiction 
requirement is satisfied by severe, immediate, physical, and 
(according to the state’s own definition) punitive restraints on 
liberty that are imposed pursuant to—and included in—the 
judgment of a state court such as the one here. Truly collateral 
consequences—such as the “inability to vote, engage in certain 
businesses, hold public office, or serve as a juror”115—are not 
analogous to the restrictive and invasive regime created under 
SORNA’s registration requirements. The physical compulsion 
of SORNA’s registration requirements and their direct relation 
to the judgment of sentence set them apart from consequences 
that are truly collateral and noncustodial.  
 
Additionally, this is not a situation where Piasecki was 
in custody as a result of an intervening judgment such as a 
separate conviction or a civil commitment hearing.116 In those 
cases, a litigant could not challenge a previously expired 
conviction that is no longer the source of any restrictions.  As 
we have explained, Piasecki’s registration requirements were 
part of his sentence and continue as such into the future. No 
separate order is involved.  
 
                                              
114 See, e.g., Calhoun 745 F.3d at 1074 (quoting Maleng, 490 
U.S. at 492)(suggesting that a holding that sex offender 
registration requirements can give rise to habeas jurisdiction 
“would read the ‘in custody’ requirement out of the statute”); 
Wilson, 689 F.3d at 339 (“To rule otherwise [and find that 
sex-offender registration requirements can support habeas 
jurisdiction] would drastically expand the writ of habeas 
corpus beyond its traditional purview and render § 2254’s ‘in 
custody’ requirement meaningless.”).  
115 Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491–92.  
116 Stanbridge, 791 F.3d at 719. 
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Finally, nothing we have said should be interpreted as 
calling into question the wisdom or propriety of 
Pennsylvania’s sex offender registration requirements. That 
determination is the province of the legislature, not the 
courts.117 The legislature determined that long-term, in-person 
registration and supervision was necessary for those who 
commit sexual offenses118—including those who possess truly 
horrific videos such as those possessed by Piasecki. Today, we 
hold only that the restrictions that follow from that level of 
supervision constitute custody for the purposes of habeas 
jurisdiction. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
The writ of habeas corpus “is not now and never has 
been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy.”119 The scope of the 
writ has grown in accordance with its purpose—to protect 
individuals against the erosion of their right to be free from 
wrongful restraints upon their liberty.120 SORNA’s registration 
requirements clearly constitute a restraint upon liberty, a 
physical restraint not shared by the public generally. The 
restraint imposed on Piasecki is a direct consequence of a state 
court judgment of sentence, and it therefore can support habeas 
corpus jurisdiction. For all of the reasons set forth above, the 
order of the District Court is vacated and the case is remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                                              
117 To the extent that we have cautioned against imposition of 
overly broad restrictions on internet and computer use, see 
supra note 73, we have done so merely to call attention to the 
ease with which such restrictions can sweep further than 
intended or warranted and to note the unintended 
consequences that may follow if they are not appropriately 
tailored to focus on the conduct that the court was attempting 
to address.  
118 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.11. 
119 Jones, 371 U.S. at 243. 
120 Id. 
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